Duration of the online course: 21 hours and 28 minutes
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Learn to think strategically in politics with this free online course—game theory, elections, bargaining, and smarter public policy decisions. Certificate-ready.
In this free course, learn about
Identify strategic situations in politics; actors, incentives, and interdependence
Model elections and fundraising as games; why incumbents fundraise even when favored
Solve sequential games via backward induction; equilibrium in perfect-information games
Explain when low-campaign, low-profile elections emerge as equilibria
Use Pareto efficiency to evaluate strategic outcomes (elections and foreign aid games)
Analyze foreign aid bargaining: conditions for aid and factors reducing aid provision
Distinguish simultaneous vs sequential games; how information and timing change play
Coordination and conflict in Battle of the Sexes; multiple equilibria and focal points
Compute mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (e.g., Cops & Robbers) from indifference
Derive outcome likelihoods in Chicken using mixed strategies and expected payoffs
Understand payoff-perturbation effects in mixed equilibria: changes affect opponent mix
Repeated games: shadow of the future, discounting, and sustaining cooperation
Grim Trigger in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: discount-factor threshold and conditions
Compare equilibrium-supporting strategies in repeated PD (e.g., tit-for-tat, grim trigger)
Course Description
Build a practical way to analyze politics by learning how strategic thinking shapes outcomes in elections, policymaking, and international decisions. This course approaches political behavior as a set of choices made under incentives and constraints, giving you a clear framework to understand why candidates fundraise, when rivals escalate or compromise, and how institutions influence what leaders can credibly promise. If you work in business, marketing, journalism, public affairs, or simply want sharper civic judgment, you will gain tools that transfer directly to real negotiations and competitive environments.
Using core ideas from game theory, you will learn how to recognize strategic situations, identify players and payoffs, and anticipate responses when choices are interdependent. The course develops intuition for both simultaneous and sequential decision-making, helping you distinguish when timing, information, and commitment change everything. You will see how concepts like equilibrium, mixed strategies, and credible threats can explain outcomes that look irrational on the surface, such as costly campaigns, low-visibility elections, or the persistence of conflict even when cooperation seems better for everyone.
Beyond elections, the course connects strategic reasoning to broader questions of public policy and international relations, including when aid is offered, when it is withheld, and how political incentives can prevent seemingly efficient outcomes. You will also explore repeated interactions and the shadow of the future: how reputations, expectations, and long-run incentives can stabilize cooperation or trigger cycles of punishment. By the end, you should be able to read political events with more discipline, evaluate arguments about strategy and power more critically, and apply structured reasoning to real-world decisions where uncertainty, competition, and persuasion matter.
Course content
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 1, UCLA1h12m
Exercise: What defines a strategic situation in the context of game theory in political science?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 2, UCLA1h12m
Exercise: In the context of the United States political system, incumbents (currently holding office politicians) sometimes engage in extensive fundraising activities, even when it appears they have a strong chance of winning the election without additional funds. Which of the following reasons best explains this behavior?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 3, UCLA1h10m
Exercise: In the context of a sequential game with perfect information, which outcome describes an equilibrium?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 4, UCLA1h11m
Exercise: In a simple game theoretical model of an election, what might be a reason for an incumbent candidate to decide against raising a large amount of campaign funds?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 5, UCLA1h03m
Exercise: In game theory, under what conditions might you observe a low-profile election where there is minimal campaigning by both incumbent and challenger?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 6, UCLA1h08m
Exercise: In the context of strategic fundraising for elections, which scenario below best reflects a Pareto efficient outcome?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 7, UCLA1h13m
Exercise: What conditions must be met for a choice between providing foreign aid by a rich government leading to a Pareto efficient outcome in the designated recipient poor government?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 8, UCLA1h05m
Exercise: Which of the following factors reduces the probability of the rich government providing aid to a poor government in a political decision-making game?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 9, UCLA1h09m
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 10, UCLA1h07m
Exercise: What distinguishes a simultaneous game from a sequential game in the context of game theory?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 11, UCLA1h08m
Exercise: In the Battle of the Sexes game involving decisions where two individuals want to spend time together, but have different preferences for activities, what key concept illustrates the central strategic challenge?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 12, UCLA1h11m
Exercise: In a game known as 'Cops and Robbers', the cops have to choose between being 'On the Beat' or 'In the Donut Shop' while the robbers can choose between being 'At Work' (committing crimes) or 'At Home'. If the cops' best outcome is when the robbers are at home and they are in the donut shop, and their worst outcome is when they are in the donut shop while the robbers are committing crimes, which of the following represents the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the players?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 13, UCLA1h05m
Exercise: In the classic 'Chicken' game, two players ride their bikes towards each other and either choose to 'Swerve' or 'Don't Swerve'. If both players do not swerve, they crash and receive the worst possible outcome. If one player swerves and the other doesn't, the one who didn't swerve is victorious while the other is considered a coward. If both players swerve, the situation is resolved but both feel embarrassed. Given the nature of the game and the possible mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, what is the likelihood of each outcome occurring?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 14, UCLA1h09m
Exercise: In a sequential game like cops and robbers, if changes are made to the payoffs of one player's strategy, whose behavior is more likely to be affected according to the peculiarities of mixed strategy Nash equilibria?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 15, UCLA1h05m
Exercise: Which of the following best describes the concept of 'the shadow of the future' in repeated games?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 16, UCLA1h09m
Exercise: In the context of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, what is the minimum value of the discount factor that would make the Grim Trigger strategy a Nash Equilibrium?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 17, UCLA1h07m
Exercise: What conditions must be met for the strategy of grim trigger to be a Nash equilibrium in the repeated prisoner's dilemma?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 18, UCLA59m
Exercise: In the context of a repeated prisoner's dilemma based on general variables, when can grim trigger strategy be considered a Nash equilibrium?
Video class: Political Science 30: Politics and Strategy, Lec 19, UCLA56m
Exercise: What are the example strategies that players can adopt within the repeated prisoner's dilemma game to achieve equilibrium?
