Scientific Theory Change: Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos

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1. 1

   A single black swan is observed after thousands of white swans. Which lesson does Popper draw from this type of case?

   

   A Universal scientific claims can be falsified by counterexamples. B Universal scientific claims become certain after many confirmations. C Observations cannot affect the status of scientific claims.
2. 2

   Why did Popper reject repeated confirmation as a sufficient basis for distinguishing science from non-science?

   A Scientific theories never make predictions about observations. B A flexible theory may interpret almost any outcome as confirmation. C Only statements about unobservable entities can be scientific.
3. 3

   Which activity best represents Kuhn's concept of normal science?

   

   A Constantly attempting to overthrow every accepted theory B Conducting research without shared assumptions or methods C Solving specialized puzzles within an accepted paradigm
4. 4

   Kuhn used perceptual Gestalt switches, such as seeing the same figure first as a duck and then as a rabbit, to illustrate what feature of scientific revolutions?

   

   A A change of paradigm can alter how scientists interpret the same evidence. B Competing paradigms always make identical claims about reality. C Scientific revolutions occur solely because instruments become more precise.
5. 5

   In Lakatos's model of a research programme, what does the central set of commitments surrounded by adjustable assumptions represent?

   

   A An isolated anomalous observation B The hard core of the research programme C A rival programme's experimental method
6. 6

   A research programme repeatedly produces unexpected predictions that are later confirmed. How would Lakatos classify its development?

   

   A As pseudoscientific solely because its theories change B As degenerating because confirmation is philosophically irrelevant C As progressive because it generates corroborated novel predictions
7. 7

   What does the Duhem-Quine problem imply about testing an individual scientific hypothesis?

   A A test usually depends on auxiliary assumptions as well as the target hypothesis. B Every hypothesis can be tested without instruments or background theories. C A failed prediction logically proves that all related theories are false.
8. 8

   Why can a so-called crucial experiment rarely prove with complete logical certainty which of two competing theories is correct?

   A Competing scientific theories cannot make different predictions. B Interpreting the result relies on auxiliary assumptions that may be challenged. C Experimental results are unrelated to theoretical evaluation.
9. 9

   Which modification would Popper most likely criticize as ad hoc?

   A A revision that makes a precise new prediction open to testing B A correction based on independently detected instrument error C A revision introduced only to block a falsification, with no new testable consequences
10. 10

    According to Kuhn, how do values such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness influence theory choice?

    A They guide judgment, but scientists may weigh them differently. B They form an algorithm that forces every scientist to choose identically. C They are relevant only during normal science and never during revolutions.
11. 11

    Two incompatible theories fit all currently observed data points but predict different future results. Which philosophical problem does this diagram illustrate?

    

    A Deductive validity B Underdetermination of theory by evidence C The verification of a universal law
12. 12

    How does Kuhn's account challenge the claim that one failed prediction should immediately cause scientists to abandon a paradigm?

    A Kuhn maintains that paradigms never encounter failed predictions. B Kuhn argues that all failed predictions are fabricated by rival scientists. C Normal science often treats failures as puzzles until anomalies become severe and persistent.
13. 13

    Which set of pairings correctly matches each philosopher with a central account of scientific change?

    A Popper—conjectures and refutations; Kuhn—paradigm revolutions; Lakatos—research programmes B Popper—normal science; Kuhn—hard cores; Lakatos—verification by accumulation C Popper—protective belts; Kuhn—deductive falsification; Lakatos—Gestalt conversion